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In the search for a neural substrate of cognitive processes, a frequently utilized method is the 
scrutiny of post-traumatic symptoms exhibited by individuals suffering focal injury to the brain. 
For instance, the presence or absence of conscious awareness within a particular domain may, 
combined with knowledge of which regions of the brain have been injured, provide important data 
in the search for neural correlates of consciousness. Like all studies addressing the consequences 
of brain injury, however, such research has to face the fact that in most cases, post-traumatic 
impairments are accompanied by a “functional recovery” during which symptoms are reduced 
or eliminated. The apparent contradiction between localization and recovery, respectively, of 
functions constitutes a problem to almost all aspects of cognitive neuroscience. Several lines 
of investigation indicate that although the brain remains highly plastic throughout life, the post-
traumatic plasticity does not recreate a copy of the neural mechanisms lost to injury. Instead, 
the uninjured parts of the brain are functionally reorganized in a manner which – in spite of 
not recreating the basic information processing lost to injury – is able to allow a more or less 
complete return of the surface phenomena (including manifestations of consciousness) originally 
impaired by the trauma. A novel model [the Reorganization of Elementary Functions-model] of 
these processes is presented – and some of its implications discussed relative to studies of 
the neural substrates of cognition and consciousness.
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and post-traumatic recovery, respectively, of various “functions.” 
Focusing on the recently developed Reorganization of Elementary 
Functions (REF)-model (Mogensen and Malá, 2009) the present 
communication discusses these issues with respect to the under-
standing of the neural substrate and post-traumatic recovery of 
cognitive functions in general. A subsequent paper (Overgaard 
and Mogensen, 2011) will deal more specifically with the issue of 
what is required in terms of theoretical conceptualization as well as 
experimental documentation if post-traumatic functional recovery 
is to be taken as documentation of multiple realizations of neural 
substrates of consciousness.
LocaLization and/or recovery
There can be little doubt that the brain is regionally specialized. 
Various brain structures and substructures perform apparently 
unique types of information processing and consequently par-
ticipate differentially in the mediation of various types of behav-
ior and cognition. In other and more commonly used words: the 
functions of the brain are regionally localized. The main support 
for this assumption grows out of two research traditions. One of 
these is the study of post-traumatic impairments in brain injured 
individuals – patients or experimental animals. In such studies, the 
profile of post-injury symptoms is compared to the localization 
and extent of brain injury. The logics of these lesion experiments 
(see e.g., Coltheart, 2001; Selnes, 2001; controlled experiments in 
animal models and clinical studies in brain injured patients) is 
that in the absence of a brain structure, the symptoms must reflect 
introduction
Research into the relationship between on the one hand brain injury 
[be it vascular or traumatic (TBI)] and on the other hand various 
cognitive processes remains a crucial part of cognitive neuroscience. 
Some of the consciousness-related phenomena studied in brain 
injured patients are hemispatial neglect and blindsight. There is a 
constantly growing body of clinical as well as experimental data on 
various types of neglect and blindsight in focally lesioned patients 
(e.g., Natsoulas, 1997; Marcel, 1998; Rossetti et al., 1998; Kentridge 
et al., 1999; Danckert and Goodale, 2000; Schindler et al., 2006; 
Bartolomeo, 2007; Silvanto et al., 2008; Funk et al., 2010). Even 
within other areas than visual perception lesion-induced dissocia-
tions between conscious and non-conscious processes are being 
addressed in attempts to yield information regarding the neural 
processes mediating subjective consciousness (e.g., Lane et al., 
1997). Studies focusing on the manifestations of consciousness 
in brain injured patients fall within the framework of research 
addressing “localization of functions” within the brain. Other cog-
nitive domains exhibit a constantly growing body of such stud-
ies, e.g., language (e.g., Thomas et al., 1997; Thulborn et al., 1999; 
Ansaldo et al., 2002; Ansaldo and Arguin, 2003; Perani et al., 2003; 
Baumgaertner et al., 2005; Meinzer et al., 2008; Specht et al., 2009; 
Szaflarski et al., 2010). Associating various functions with specific 
brain regions is one of the main research traditions of cognitive 
neuroscience. But it is also an endeavor facing both methodologi-
cal and theoretical challenges (e.g., Mogensen and Malá, 2009) – 
not the least the apparent contradiction between the localization Frontiers in Psychology  | Consciousness Research    January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 7  |  2
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functional recovery is independent of interactions with the environ-
ment. Some instances in which a “spontaneous” recovery may be 
of a more automatic nature can, however, be seen in cases where a 
lesion-induced “penumbra” gradually disappears. The “penumbra” 
phenomenon can briefly be described as a situation in which injury 
within one part of the brain causes other brain areas to receive a 
reduced level of blood supply. While being sufficient for the survival 
of neurons within that penumbra region, the reduced blood supply 
does not allow a normal level of functionality. Consequently, the 
observable symptoms are not only associated with the trauma per 
se but also with the impaired neural activities within the penumbra. 
Penumbras, however, mostly disappear spontaneously and allow 
a return to normal levels of functional performance within that 
region of the brain (e.g., Choi et al., 2007).
Although sometimes incomplete, this post-traumatic functional 
recovery may both clinically and in animal models turn out to be 
“complete” – defined as the acquisition of a post-traumatic profi-
ciency equal to that seen in the absence of any brain injury (e.g., 
Mogensen et al., 2004). In case of animal models, this is even seen 
under circumstances ensuring the complete removal of the brain 
structure in question as well as a well-established pre-traumatic 
functional baseline.
If the relatively few instances in which post-traumatic symp-
toms can be associated with penumbras or similar phenomena 
are excluded, what remains is the apparent contradiction between 
the two phenomena of “functional localization” and “recovery of 
function.”
A radical and maybe tempting way to utilize lesion experiments 
without having to deal with the contradiction between localiza-
tion and recovery of functions is to accept only the post-traumatic 
symptoms as relevant to arguments regarding functional specializa-
tion, in case those symptoms turn out to be “chronic” – never to 
demonstrate any functional recovery. Such a radical position has 
been advocated by Olton (1978). It has to be realized, however, that 
if only those instances in which post-traumatic impairments persist 
chronically are to be considered when conclusions are drawn from 
lesion experiments, the vast majority of such clinical and animal 
model derived data would have to be discarded.
But the arguments against dismissing all but the chronic post-
traumatic symptoms for consideration when the principles of 
localization are considered, are not only of such a practical nature 
(although disregarding almost the entire mass of post-traumatic 
data is in itself not an insignificant obstacle!). The fact that a func-
tional recovery can actually take place in spite of the continued 
presence of a lesion, which originally had such an impact on the 
information processing of the brain that significant symptoms 
occurred, is in itself a highly relevant phenomenon. It indicates 
dynamic changes, which must be an essential part of the functional 
organization of the brain. If these phenomena are not considered 
in neuroscientific studies and the construction of various models, 
the result will be an incomplete and lacking understanding of the 
functionally dynamic brain.
But in which ways, then, can one imagine the apparent return 
(potentially to a normal level of proficiency) of the behavioral and 
cognitive abilities of a brain injured organism? One possibility is 
that post-traumatically the brain is able to reconstruct – within the 
region of injury or elsewhere – a circuitry, which can accomplish 
the absence of functional contributions from the affected neural 
machinery – and that with the proper analysis and comparisons 
across symptoms, conclusions can be drawn regarding the infor-
mation processing of the missing brain circuitry. A more recent 
contribution to this type of study is the use of transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (e.g., Pascual-Leone et al., 1999, 2000; Walsh and 
Cowey, 2000) in which the functional integrity of a part of the brain 
is temporarily disturbed – allowing an analysis of the consequences 
of what can be seen as a “temporary lesion.” The other main source 
of support for functional localization within the brain is the studies 
utilizing various types of neuroimaging techniques. By studying 
the regional pattern of brain activation during the performance 
of various tests, one can – provided adequate baseline measures 
are utilized for the “subtraction” from the test condition – pro-
vide information about whether or not a particular brain structure 
changes its level of activity (often reflected directly or indirectly 
as a change in metabolism and blood supply) in association with 
the performance of a particular task or stimulation. Numerous 
contradictions exist within these branches of the neuroscientific lit-
erature, but there is an overall agreement that although often poorly 
understood, there is a regional functional specialization within the 
brain – a “functional localization” (e.g., Monakow, 1914; Coltheart, 
2001; Selnes, 2001; Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004).
As mentioned above, a crucial aspect of the interpretation of 
results from various types of “lesion experiments” is that in the 
absence of a brain structure – and consequently the functional 
contributions from that circuitry – the behavior and conscious 
manifestations of the individual must reflect the lack of whatever 
functional contributions were provided by the now missing part 
of the brain. But if it is assumed that the lost circuitry is post-
traumatically never regained (an issue to which I will return later), 
one should expect the impairments after brain injury to be chronic. 
Nevertheless, it is a well-established fact that a post-traumatic func-
tional recovery does occur.
In patients as well as in animal models of brain injury, most 
lesion-associated impairments post-traumatically undergo some 
level of “recovery” – at least within cognitive domains not closely 
linked to the direct in- and output pathways. Less or even no 
recovery may be seen within some sensory and motoric domains. 
But for almost all “higher” cognitive functions, trauma-related 
impairments are followed by an apparent return toward the profi-
ciency seen pre-traumatically (e.g., Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 
1998; Carney et al., 1999; Buller and Hardcastle, 2000; Panksepp 
and Panksepp, 2000; León-Carrión and Machuca-Murga, 2001; 
Mogensen et al., 2004, 2007; Mogensen and Malá, 2009; Rohling 
et al., 2009). In most cases, such a functional recovery is associated 
with more or less formalized and institutionalized rehabilitative 
training, but in the absence of such training, “spontaneous” recov-
ery is also seen (e.g., León-Carrión and Machuca-Murga, 2001). It 
must, however, be remembered that even in the absence of a formal-
ized post-traumatic training program, practically all brain injured 
organisms (patients and experimental animals alike) are subjected 
to the informal training of daily life activities. Even the most basic 
daily activities and communicative efforts constitute challenges and 
tasks which the brain injured individual must attempt to meet and 
master. Consequently, the absence of an externally imposed training 
regime does not allow a claim that the potential occurrence of a www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 7  |  3
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(e.g., Berry, 1982; Schwab and Thoenen, 1985; Schäfer et al., 2008). 
Especially important may be the astrocyte-produced chondroitin 
sulfate proteoglycans (CSPGs), which play an important role in 
terminating the developmentally “critical” periods (e.g., Pizzorusso 
et al., 2002; Berardi et al., 2004; McGee et al., 2005). While consoli-
dating the plastic processes occurring during critical periods, these 
substances may also play a role, which prevents an adult recreation 
of the circuit lost to injury (e.g., Del Rio and Soriano, 2007; Schäfer 
et al., 2008). An improved functional recovery (potentially associated 
with recreation of lost circuitry) has been found when the CSPGs 
are pharmacologically inhibited locally (e.g., Del Rio and Soriano, 
2007). While such a local inhibition may have therapeutic potentials 
in the future, the results also demonstrate that without an external 
intervention, the CSPGs are likely to prevent or at least reduce the 
possibility of a post-traumatic re-establishment of the circuitry and 
thereby information processing lost to trauma.
the mechanisms of post-traumatic functionaL 
recovery
While it is important in these ways to establish whether the post-
traumatically available neuroplasticity seems capable of processes, 
which can create a copy of what has been lost – another and at 
least as important approach is to scrutinize the neural and cogni-
tive processes accompanying the actual functional recovery. An 
extensive animal model-based research program (e.g., Mogensen 
et al., 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007) has performed such an analy-
sis and some of the results have been reviewed by Mogensen and 
Malá (2009). What has emerged is a pattern of principles regarding 
the mechanisms mediating post-traumatic recovery. Three general 
principles are especially important – describing the situation after 
a successful post-traumatic rehabilitation:
1.  Modification of degree of contribution to task mediation by 
individual brain structures
•	Some	structures	exhibit	an	increased	or	decreased	level	of	
contribution to task mediation.
2.  Task dependent and dissimilar neural substrates
•	After	a	given	lesion,	the	functional	recovery	of	various	cog-
nitive tasks is mediated by unique and dissimilar neural 
substrates.
3.  Application of new cognitive strategies
•	The	fully	post-traumatically	recovered	individuals	solve	the	
task by applying new strategies that are dissimilar to those 
applied pre-traumatically.
These three principles – like the above consideration of the 
types of plasticity available in the developing and injured, mature 
brain, respectively – indicate that a recreation of the lost circuitry 
is unlikely. Both the second and third of the above principles show 
that the neural mechanisms mediating post-traumatic functional 
recovery do not include a copy of what has been lost to trauma. If 
any part of the injured brain at the end of rehabilitation training 
contained a circuitry similar to what was pre-traumatically avail-
able, it would be expected that all cognitive domains affected by the 
lesion would post-traumatically receive equal contribution to func-
tional recovery from the brain region within which the circuitry 
had been (re)created. This possibility, however, is contradicted by 
an information processing similar to what has been lost to injury. 
Although it is well known that the actual site of injury mostly turn 
into scar tissue, this does not in itself preclude the possibility of a 
recreation somewhere in the brain of circuitry fulfilling the same 
information processing demands as the lost structure.
is the basic circuitry of the brain recreated 
post-traumaticaLLy?
In order to evaluate the likeliness that a reconstruction of the lost 
circuitry can occur in the injured brain, it is relevant to compare 
the types of plasticity available in the injured adult brain to the 
plastic processes, which contribute to the original construction of 
such networks during development.
When the adult brain is injured, the trauma itself induces a 
range of changes in gene expression – both in the tissue immedi-
ately surrounding the site of injury and in more remote parts of 
the brain. Some such changes are likely primarily to contribute to 
the detrimental effects of the injury – for instance by promoting 
metabolic dysfunction, inflammatory responses, etc. (e.g., Delfs 
et al., 1995; Hermann et al., 1999; Harris et al., 2001; Rao et al., 
2003). Other changes in gene expression are likely to be supportive 
of rehabilitation – promoting plasticity and reorganization (e.g., 
Witte, 1998; Frost et al., 2003; Kleim et al., 2003; Nudo, 2003). 
One such process may be the increased occurrence of long-term 
potentiation (LTP) like synaptic plasticity after brain injury (e.g., 
Hagemann et al., 1998).
Relative to the issue of recreation of circuitry similar to what 
has been lost to injury, it might be especially relevant that injury 
to the brain potentiates the ongoing neurogenesis (e.g., Magavi 
et al., 2000; Scharff et al., 2000; Arvidsson et al., 2002; Nakatomi 
et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2004). A reason for this to be impor-
tant is that during maturation neurons undergo a number of 
changes – reducing their similarity to the developing neurons, 
which originally formed various circuits (e.g., Fawcett et al., 1989; 
Chen et al., 1995; Goldberg et al., 2002). In contrast, the newly 
formed neurons produced by adult neurogenesis are unlikely to 
have similar limitations.
If the newly created neurons in the injured brain are to reach a 
specific destination and contribute to recreation of a circuit, they 
will have to migrate in an appropriate manner. After injury, mature 
astrocytes are able to transform themselves into radial glial cells 
similar to those guiding neural migration during development (e.g., 
Rakic, 1971, 1985). Such radial glial cells are able to guide the migra-
tion of immature neurons even in the adult brain (e.g., Leavitt et al., 
1999). Further optimism regarding the potentials of the injured 
adult brain may come from the fact that most substances, which 
played a guiding role during the original outgrowth of dendrites and 
axons (e.g., Keynes and Cook, 1992; Brose et al., 1999; Chen et al., 
2000; Hiramoto et al., 2000; Polleux et al., 2000) are also present in 
the adult brain (e.g., Koeberle and Bahr, 2004). This optimism may, 
however, be tempered by the observation that the distribution of 
these substances undergoes major changes during the maturation of 
the brain – making it questionable whether they in an injured adult 
brain can play similar roles to those of development (e.g., Harel and 
Strittmatter, 2006). The most important factors preventing imma-
ture neurons in the adult nervous system from recreating the injured 
circuitry, may, however, be associated with glial cells and myelin Frontiers in Psychology  | Consciousness Research    January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 7  |  4
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the neural substrates of these EFs. This makes the neural substrate 
of an AS highly distributed and in most cases components of the 
neural substrate of an AS will be found within a number of brain 
structures. The information processing of an AS is the mechanism 
enabling a specific surface phenomenon. For instance, a specific 
type of solution of a task is obtained by activation of a particular 
AS. Most surface phenomena can be realized via the activity of 
multiple ASs. Unless special analytical techniques are employed, 
it may at the surface level not be possible to discriminate between 
behavioral or conscious phenomena reflecting two related but dif-
ferent ASs. Whenever brain injury destroys the neural substrate of 
one or more of the constituent EFs within an AS, that AS is lost. 
Consequently, the surface phenomena associated with the activity 
of the lost AS are also lost and post-traumatically an impairment 
is registered.
According to the REF-model, the mechanisms enabling a post-
traumatic functional recovery are special cases of a more general 
mechanism, which in the intact brain has evolved as a crucial aspect 
of learning and problem solving. When an individual encounters a 
situation calling for a task solution for which there is no established 
procedure available, a mechanism is initiated during which various 
existing ASs are “tested out.” A “selector/evaluator” mechanism – which 
resembles (without being identical to) the “Supervisory Attentional 
System” (SAS) of Norman and Shallice (1986) – sequentially acti-
vates existing ASs. When activated, an AS results in the associated 
surface phenomenon and, in turn, the quality of the resultant behav-
ior or mental manifestation is evaluated. In case the desired result is 
obtained, activation of that AS will in the future be associated with 
the situation in question. This mechanism resembles – without being 
identical to – the mechanism of “hypotheses” evaluation described 
by Krechevsky (1932, 1933). In case activation of an existing AS can 
obtain the desired result, the neural plasticity associated with this 
entire process is restricted to modifications within the selector/evalu-
ator mechanism – plasticity ensuring a future association between the 
situation in question and activation of the successfully selected AS.
If, however, a situation requiring the solution of a problem 
cannot be solved by activation of any existing AS, a novel AS will 
have to be established. The creation of a novel AS involves a reor-
ganization of the functional interaction between EFs. This is the 
“Reorganization of Elementary Functions” process, which has given 
name to the REF-model. Such a reorganization (see Mogensen and 
Malá, 2009) utilizes a type of process resembling the backpropaga-
tion algorithm (e.g., Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986; Werbos, 
1994). Such mechanisms – constantly utilizing the feedback of the 
environment – form a novel AS by combining a set of EFs, which 
previously did not constitute an interacting entity. Whenever such a 
REF-process is required in order to successfully obtain a task solu-
tion, the required neuroplasticity includes modified connections 
between the neural substrates of the constituent EFs. Additionally, 
the complete process of eventual activation of the novel AS and its 
association with the situation in question is also associated with 
neuroplasticity within the evaluator/selector mechanism. A sche-
matic representation of these processes is given in Figure 1.
These processes of selection and potentially even de novo estab-
lishment of ASs when a novel situation is encountered are according 
to the REF-model essential mechanisms in the mediation of normal 
problem solving. What is special about brain injury is that many 
Principle 2. Additionally, Principle 3 contradicts the post-traumatic 
re-establishment of information processing identical to what was 
available pre-traumatically: if post-traumatic processes had re-es-
tablished the information processing of the injured structure, one 
would expect not only task solution of a proficiency similar to that 
seen preoperatively, but also that such a task solution would employ 
similar strategies to those of the pre-traumatic situation.
But if the post-traumatic functional recovery is not mediated 
via mechanisms recreating what has been lost to injury, how can 
a sometimes even complete level of proficiency be re-established 
within traumatically impaired cognitive domains?
The recently proposed REF model of Mogensen and Malá (2009) 
is an attempt to describe neural and cognitive mechanisms, which – 
in spite of the absence of a recreation of the lost circuitry – can 
account for a potentially full proficiency of post-traumatic cogni-
tive recovery.
At the most basic level of the REF-model are the information 
processing modules named Elementary Functions (EFs). The EFs 
are truly localized in the sense that they are mediated by local cir-
cuitry within a structure of the brain. Each traditionally defined 
neural structure (e.g., the hippocampus or the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex) contains the neural substrates of a huge number of 
EFs. When a region of the brain is lost to injury, all EFs mediated by 
the lost tissue are – according to the REF-model – irreversibly lost, 
too. The information processing of an individual EF is of a highly 
basic and “modular” type. An EF does not in itself have any of the 
“functions” traditionally described by psychology. Psychologically 
defined functions such as object discrimination, explicit memory, 
or allocentric spatial orientation belong at a different level of analy-
sis (to be described shortly). The “function” of an EF may more 
easily be described in mathematical terms – rather than in the 
vocabulary of for instance cognitive psychology. In contrast, the 
“functions” and cognitive domains normally described by psychol-
ogy are in the REF-model represented at the third and highest 
level – the level of surface phenomena. The surface phenomena 
of the REF-model consist of observable behavior (for instance the 
performance of a task by a patient or an experimental animal) as 
well as conscious manifestations such as the subjective experience 
of recognizing a familiar face or planning a course of action in order 
to solve a problem. It is at the level of these surface phenomena 
that post-traumatic functional recovery is normally defined and 
evaluated. Tests conducted in order to determine what is impaired 
by brain injury address the observable behavior as well as whatever 
representations can be obtained of the subjective experiences of the 
patient. And it is at the same level that the more or less complete 
recovery of these impaired dimensions of cognition and conscious-
ness are determined – using similar methods to those utilized dur-
ing diagnosis. An essential component of the REF-model is the layer 
of analysis introduced between the basic layer of the EFs and the 
uppermost layer of the surface phenomena. This intermediate level 
consists of the processes named algorithmic strategies (ASs).
Each AS consists of numerous interacting EFs. Most – if not 
all – ASs are established as the result of experience and learning. 
Most EFs are simultaneously part of several or many ASs. While 
the individual EFs are strictly localized within a subregion of the 
brain, the neural substrate of an AS consists of the neural substrates 
of all its constituent EFs as well as the interconnections between www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 7  |  5
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an available and appropriate AS will be successful. Alternatively, the 
REF-process (including backpropagation-based reorganization of 
interconnectivity between the neural substrates of EFs) is required 
in order to obtain a satisfactory solution to the task. Viewed in this 
way, the processes allowing a post-traumatic functionally recovery 
to take place have mostly if not exclusively evolved as mechanisms 
mediating problem solving in the intact brain.
In one study addressing the types of neural and cognitive reor-
ganizational processes described by the REF-model (Mogensen 
et al., 2004) the mechanisms of post-traumatic functional   recovery 
situations, for which there used to be an established mechanism of 
task solution, will after the traumatic event have a status similar to 
novel situations. The AS, which would normally be activated and 
ensure an efficient task solution, is no longer available since some 
of its constituent EFs have been lost to injury. Consequently, there 
is no immediately available mechanism of task solution. Which 
leads to the above-described mechanisms of initial search for an 
appropriate AS. Since multiple ASs might pre-traumatically have 
been able to allow an efficient task solution, some of these might 
post-traumatically still be available. If this is the case, the search for 
Figure 1 | Flow diagram depicting the sequence of events, which according 
to the reF-model leads to a successful development of a task solution – 
potentially a successful functional recovery after brain injury. These 
processes are always associated with plastic modifications within the selector/
evaluator mechanisms. Additional plasticity modifying the connections between 
the neural substrates of EFs is only expected in case an actual Reorganization of 
Elementary Functions (REF) process is required. For further details: see the 
present text as well as Figures 3, 4, and 5 in Mogensen and Malá (2009).Frontiers in Psychology  | Consciousness Research    January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 7  |  6
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within a novel context – within the newly established AS. The situ-
ation in which an information processing module continues to 
perform its previous operations but on a novel input, bears a certain 
resemblance to some of the plastic processes found in uninjured 
brains. The somatosensory cortex, which after the amputation of a 
hand has become “vacant,” continues its functional activities – but 
now operating on information regarding the face or arm (e.g., Yang 
et al., 1994; Weiss et al., 2000; Karl et al., 2001). Such relative shifts 
within the somatosensory representations can also be seen after 
intensive training restricted to part of the body (e.g., Merzenich 
and Jenkins, 1993; Elbert et al., 1995; Xerri et al., 1996; Münte et al., 
2002). These plastic processes within the somatosensory system are 
not unique. Within the auditory system tonotopic representations 
undergo plastic changes due to changes in input or experience 
(e.g., Robertson and Irvine, 1989; Scheich, 1991; Recanzone et al., 
1993; Irvine, 2007; Thai-Van et al., 2007). Another obvious parallel 
is the situation in which a cortical area specialized in analysis of 
figure orientation within the visual domain can become engaged 
in apparently similar or at least related information processing on 
somatosensory information in the blind (Ptito et al., 2005).
Given the highly specialized information processing units of 
the REF-model – the EFs – this model falls within what is called 
“Massive Modularity” by for instance Barrett and Kurzban (2006). 
It should, however, be noted that the modularity of the REF-model 
is far from identical to the kind of modularity described by Fodor 
(1983). That radical type of modularity has, however, subsequently 
been denounced by Fodor (2000) himself.
As emphasized above and by Mogensen and Malá (2009), 
according to the REF-model apparently the same surface phe-
nomenon may be achieved by activation of a variety of ASs. In the 
terminology of Price and Friston (Price and Friston, 2002; Friston 
and Price, 2003) such a situation represents a degeneracy relative 
to the manifestation of the surface phenomena. In cases where 
multiple ASs give rise to surface phenomena that cannot be dis-
tinguished from each other and that surface phenomenon is then 
characterized as one “function,” such a “function” is degenerate. 
It should, however, be stressed that according to the REF-model, 
such a degeneracy is the result of considering multiple surface 
phenomena, which might by a more or less superficial examina-
tion be indistinguishable from each other, “the same” – in spite 
of the fact that these surface phenomena are in reality different 
(although perhaps only marginally so). This analysis seems to 
be in agreement with a number of the examples given by Price 
and Friston (2002). Degeneracy is by Price and Friston (2002) 
illustrated by examples in which successful solution of a task (in 
the terminology of the REF-model: surface phenomenon) can be 
achieved via activity in separate and potentially not overlapping 
neural systems. It is recognized that – for instance in case of a 
linguistic task – the separate systems which are individually able 
to achieve a successful task solution do perform dissimilar types 
of information processing and thereby mediate dissimilar types 
of cognitive analysis. Such systems would in the REF-model be 
identified as separate ASs. While degeneracy might, thus, apply 
to the neural and cognitive mechanisms of a particular surface 
phenomenon, there is according to the REF-model no degeneracy 
with respect to the substrate of EFs. An EF and its neural substrate 
are unique and if lost due to injury not replaced.
of a water maze based allocentric place learning task of the mapping 
type was addressed in rats subjected to various types of focal brain 
injury. Lesions of the hippocampus provoked a major functional 
impairment, which, however, disappeared completely during an 
approximately 1 month long post-traumatic training period – leav-
ing the animals capable of a task proficiency indistinguishable from 
that of intact rats. This recovery process depended on contributions 
from the prefrontal cortex. Relying on partly prefrontal cortical 
mechanisms, the animals could thus achieve a fully proficient sur-
face phenomenon – task performance. It turned out, however, that 
even rats subjected to hippocampal lesions as well as removal of the 
prefrontal cortex were able to achieve an equal – that is: normal – 
proficiency of task performance within a similar period of training. 
In the absence of both hippocampal and prefrontal contributions 
to the mediation of task performance, the neural substrate of task 
solution appeared to depend upon neural mechanisms within the 
parietal association cortex. In terms of behavioral parameters such 
as the time and swim distance required to reach the hidden tar-
get location, functional recovery mediated by mechanisms within 
the prefrontal cortex and parietal association cortex, respectively, 
were of equal proficiency. In the terminology of the REF-model 
this means that equally proficient ASs can be constructed on the 
basis of populations of EFs including either prefrontally based EFs 
or EFs mediated by the parietal association cortex, respectively. 
Although equally proficient, the ASs relying on prefrontal and pari-
etal mechanisms, respectively, differed with respect to the cogni-
tive mechanisms (as opposed to proficiency) of task solution (as 
would be expected from the REF-model): While the recovered task 
solution in animals relying on prefrontal task mediation included 
cognitive representations of the goal position, such a “knowledge” 
of the spatial location of the goal appeared to be absent in even 
fully recovered animals relying on mechanisms within the parietal 
association cortex (Mogensen et al., 2004).
The situation in which a “complete post-traumatic functional 
recovery” is encountered as described at the level of surface phe-
nomena, the actual situation is that the post-traumatically selected 
and potentially established AS is able to allow such a proficiency 
of task solution that – using standard methods of analysis – the 
result cannot be distinguished from the pre-traumatic situation. 
Although each AS is, in fact, associated with a particular way of 
solving the task, the observable behavior or subjective experience at 
the level of surface phenomena may in all of these cases be similar 
enough to be (in a sense wrongly) identified as “the same.” And it 
is this “sameness” of in reality dissimilar surface phenomena that is 
a crucial aspect of the apparent contradiction between localization 
and post-traumatic recovery of functions. What is truly localized 
are the EFs, and when the neural substrate of these basic informa-
tion processing entities is lost, there is no recovery of the “function” 
associated with that information processing. In contrast, functional 
recovery is identified at the level of surface phenomena where highly 
detailed and special analytical techniques are required in order to 
discriminate between the phenomena associated with activation 
of various ASs.
The dynamic reorganizations associated with the REF-process 
only affect the input/output relationships of the EFs. The actual 
information processing conducted by the individual EF remains 
unchanged. It does, however, contribute this information   processing www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 7  |  7
Mogensen  Reorganization of the injured brain
While animal model-based studies are often able to more clearly 
demonstrate the procedure and setup-related differences in the 
degree or even presence of post-traumatic symptoms and post-
traumatic recovery, clinical data are frequently of a more anecdotal 
nature. There are, however, studies in which such phenomena have 
been scrutinized in patients under controlled circumstances. One 
example is the results of Wilms and Malá (2010). The background of 
this study is a fascinating method of rehabilitative training of brain 
injured patients suffering hemispatial neglect (e.g., Rossetti et al., 
1998): the prism adaptation therapy (PAT; e.g., Rossetti et al., 1998; 
Frassinetti et al., 2002). In this method, the patients are trained in 
a task requiring them to point (without being able visually to fol-
low their arm during the pointing movement) to targets defined 
by the therapist – and doing so when wearing prism goggles which 
diverts the visual field 10° to the right (the patients are exhibiting a 
hemispatial neglect of the left hemispace). Normally, the feedback 
provided to the patient is the sight of the pointing finger at the 
moment when the pointing movement has been terminated. In 
most cases, the patient will gradually adapt to the perceptual shift 
and eventually show an after-effect in the form of a relative shift of 
the pointing movement – even after the removal of the goggles. In 
other words, the procedure constitutes an at least partial therapeutic 
intervention regarding the neglect of the left hemispace. It has been 
demonstrated that an essential element of the procedure is the 
feedback regarding the precision of the pointing movements during 
the training period (e.g., Frassinetti et al., 2002; Serino et al., 2006, 
2007; Sarri et al., 2008). In the study by Wilms and Malá (2010) 
this traditional version of the PAT-procedure was included – and 
compared directly to a procedure in which the patients pointed 
to a touch-sensitive computer screen and feedback was provided 
graphically on the screen rather than via the direct sight of the 
pointing finger. Surprisingly, in both patients and normal subjects 
the two procedures differed significantly – the version in which an 
icon on the computer screen provided the feedback did not lead to 
any demonstrable after-effect.
Clinically, this specificity of the post-traumatic recovery poses 
a significant problem with respect to obtaining a therapeutic out-
come, which generalizes to for instance the every-day-situations of 
the patient at home or at the work place. But with respect to studies 
addressing neural organization and reorganization – and for that 
matter the neural substrate of consciousness – this specificity may 
present both problems and promises.
The problems caused by the rather specific reorganizations pro-
voked by a particular post-traumatic training process are primarily 
related to the (lack of) generality of the conclusions, which can be 
drawn from studies of a “functionally recovered” patient or animal. 
The pattern of neural mechanisms (e.g., regional activations seen 
in neuroimaging studies) and cognitive mechanisms allowing a 
more or less successful task solution cannot be seen as a more global 
indication of which parts of the brain are able to “take over” from 
those lost to injury. Instead, the observable pattern is the result of 
a specific process, which in principle is only designed to solve the 
manifestation of the task, which has been trained.
But exactly this specificity may also become a window through 
which much more detailed information can be obtained. If cer-
tain demands are fulfilled, a novel – more difficult and refined 
– but also more promising type of “localization” research may 
impLication of the reorganizations of the  
injured brain
When studying brain injured individuals it is important to realize 
that the result of the recovery process is not – at the neural and 
more basic cognitive levels – a return to the pre-traumatic situa-
tion. Instead it constitutes a novel state of affairs, which has been 
constructed in an interaction with the environment during the 
period of rehabilitation. The ASs which form the basis of the post-
traumatically observable surface phenomena have been selected 
and potentially constructed via the interactions between the injured 
individual and the broadly defined environment. This means that 
a post-traumatic recovery process can be very situational specific. 
While the symptoms within a cognitive domain can appear to have 
disappeared completely when tested in one situation and under 
certain circumstances, symptoms within the same cognitive domain 
in the same individual may be evident and for that matter show no 
signs of recovery when tested under different circumstances.
As has been emphasized elsewhere (e.g., Mogensen, 2003, 2011; 
Mogensen, in preparation; Overgaard and Mogensen, 2011; Wilms 
and Mogensen, in preparation) animal models have frequently 
demonstrated that while one variant (/setup) of a cognitive test is 
able to reveal a striking level of post-traumatic impairment, another 
test (/setup), which characterized according to the formal demands 
of that cognitive test must be considered identical, shows no sign 
of post-traumatic impairment.
Across all studied species, animals subjected to lesions within 
the prefrontal cortex or the associated structures such as the pre-
frontal part of the neostriatum show an impaired performance of 
the task known as spatial delayed alternation (e.g., Mogensen, 2003; 
Mogensen et al., 2007, 2008). Nevertheless, even this phenomenon is 
more situational specific than one would have expected. Mogensen 
et al. (1987) tested rats subjected to lesions of the prefrontal part 
of the neostriatum (a lesion which also renders the prefrontal cor-
tex inoperable due to undercutting) in two variants of the spatial 
delayed alternation task. While the variant administered in a T-maze 
clearly revealed the expected symptoms, an operant chamber-based 
version of the task (in spite of fulfilling all the procedural/cognitive 
demands normally made on such a test setup) showed no sign of 
post-traumatic impairment. A somewhat related demonstration 
of the importance of the procedures employed in animal models 
can be found in a study by Lepore et al. (1985). Cats were tested for 
their ability to transfer visual discrimination-relevant information 
from one hemisphere to the other in the absence of the corpus 
callosum – the main pathway between the two hemispheres. After 
having acquired the visual discrimination task based on one hemi-
sphere exclusively (information was provided via one eye only in 
animals with a split optic chiasm), cats subjected to lesions of the 
corpus callosum were tested for their ability to perform the task 
with only the contralateral eye open – a situation in which the task 
performance had to be based on the hemisphere contralateral to 
the one originally trained. The animals were tested for this ability 
in two experimental setups: a “Lashley-type” jumping-stand and 
a traditional (maze-like) two-choice discrimination box. When 
tested in the discrimination box, the cats did not demonstrate any 
ability to transfer information between the hemispheres subcal-
losally, while such an ability was clearly revealed when the test was 
performed in the jumping-stand.Frontiers in Psychology  | Consciousness Research    January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 7  |  8
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be   conducted. Scrutinizing the post-traumatic situation in both 
patients and experimental animals, such research may elucidate 
central aspects of the organization and post-traumatic reorganiza-
tion of the brain – thereby providing a better insight into the neural 
mechanisms of cognition and consciousness.
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